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Abstract - Industry, finance, and other business activities 
are increasingly reliant on computer networks and 
systems, which demand effective interoperability of 
systems. But this also demands effective systems security, 
which poses a major challenge to the socio-technical 
interactions enabled by interoperable tools. This paper 
addresses modeling of the linkages between 
interoperability and security in the model design stage of 
systems development. It considers current interoperability 
frameworks and the manner in which they may be 
combined with security standards and desirable 
characteristics to create trusted, robust systems that are 
central to the operation of network enabled large scale 
applications. An holistic approach for interoperability and 
security is presented based on systems requirements 
modeling and model based architecting principles. 
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1 Introduction 
Modern society depends on effective interoperability 
between systems but, at the same time, increased 
interoperability may lead to greater risks to systems 
security. The objective of this paper is to link 
interoperability frameworks to information protection 
approaches and systems security engineering using 
modeling approaches such as requirement elicitation and 
modeling, and model driven architecting principles. This 
paper describes the context and challenges associated with 
system of systems interoperability and security 
engineering, and explains the approaches and initial 
results derived within a new research programme, iGRC 
(Integrated Governance, Risk and Compliance, 
http://www.igrc.co.uk).   
The interoperability frameworks considered are: 
ATHENA-IP (Advanced Technologies for interoperability 
of Heterogeneous Enterprise Networks and their 
Applications Integrated Project) [1], EIF (European 
Interoperability Framework) [2], INTEROP-VLAB (The 
International Virtual Laboratory for Enterprise 
Interoperability) [3], and SCOPE (Systems, Capabilities, 
Operations, Programs, and Enterprises) of NCOIC 
(Network Centric Operations Industrial Consortium) [4].  
Interoperability is a key concern for network enabled 
complex systems and “systems of systems” which has 
facilitated advancement of highly collaborative 
environments such as virtual organizations and extended 
enterprises together with their supply chains. Several 
important aspects of enterprise interoperability have been 
the focus of European IST programmes and initiatives such 
as EIF, INTEROP-VLAB and ATHENA - IP. But without 
sufficient security guarantees, organizations will not be 
willing to share information and collaborate using 
interoperable software tools. Thus, holistic approaches to 
interoperability and security are needed and should be 
directed to the development of tools for supporting security 
engineering and broader information security risk 
management programmes. These approaches should 
consider organizational and human factors, such as 
personal responsibilities (policies and best practice for 
system security) from the earliest stage of the analysis.  
The requirements view of a model is very important 
because it drives the system modeling (e.g. the definition of 
use-case diagrams in UML), and subsequently the 
development of the system. Usually, designers specify 
system models along with their requirements and use tools 
to automatically generate system architectures from the 
models including complete, configured access control 
infrastructures. 
2 “Real-World” Interoperable Secure 
Systems 
Despite a huge amount of literature on interoperability 
research and applications, e.g. [6],[7],[8], the development 
and implementation of interoperable systems in industrial 
and business contexts are at an  early stage. There are still 
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several issues that will require novel solutions. Some of 
these issues are explained below:  
1. The use of standards and architectural frameworks 
does not always guarantee achievement of desired 
levels of interoperability; 
2. Non-technical issues, such as culture, human 
communication, and interaction alongside 
computer and human-domain specific knowledge, 
are proven to be barriers to achieving 
interoperability [5]; 
3. There is a need for analysis and evaluation of 
interoperability itself; 
4. Rapid development of technology may decrease 
the degree of systems interoperability if the 
interoperability requirements are not fully 
considered at the design stage.  
An important area of concern is that the 
interoperability frameworks do not sufficiently address 
information protection, trust and security. These issues are 
crucial for assuring trusted electronic business 
relationships and virtual/online collaboration as well as 
network enablement in supply chains and defence. A 
number of gaps have been identified in software 
engineering methods applied to the design and 
development of secure systems [9], [10], and whilst recent 
ontology driven systems development has a positive impact 
on interoperability, its openness increases systems 
vulnerabilities to security.  
Information security is different from IT systems 
security. For many years the focus has been mainly on IT 
security (e.g. cryptographic analysis) and usually the 
implementation of security tools has been done by IT 
departments and computer experts. During the early 90s 
key aspects started to change and the first draft of an 
information security management standard BS 7799 was 
produced.  It focused on security related to the synergies of 
people, processes, and information as well as IT systems. 
Since then, early security management standards have been 
transformed into international standards published by 
ISO/IEC. These standards are being used by enterprises 
and organizations, and there are currently several 
initiatives holistically capturing security issues related to 
people, organization and technology. However application 
of standards does not guarantee solving the broad spectrum 
of systems security problems. 
This paper explores existing solutions and proposes ideas 
to bridge the gaps. The main contribution is the 
identification of the requirements for a design model of 
secure interoperable systems. Such systems would maintain 
an acceptable level of interoperability without 
compromising information protection and systems security 
requirements as defined in standard ISO/IEC 13335. The 
paper also contributes to the advancement of integrating 
systems, software, and security engineering by conceptually 
linking interoperability approaches and security 
engineering, which has been defined in relation to software 
engineering [9] and Enterprise Security Architecture [11].  
3 Integrating Interoperability and 
Security Models 
3.1 Model-Driven Approach 
Model-Driven (Software and Systems) Engineering 
(MDE) is a promising approach [12] that:  
1. deals with models as an important artefact during 
software development;  
2. envisages the problem and the solution domain at 
different levels of abstractions and; 
3. defines methodologies for each level of abstraction 
and provides techniques to lower the level of 
abstraction by defining relationships between the 
participating models.  
The development of models using model driven 
approaches is already used in software and systems 
engineering [12]. The construction of models during 
requirements analysis and system design can improve the 
quality of the resulting systems by providing a foundation 
for early analysis [10].  The models also provide support 
for systems specifications for the later development phases 
and, when the models are sufficiently formal, they can 
provide a basis for implementation. 
Model Driven Architecture [13], [14] is a concept and 
approach to specifying and developing applications where 
systems are represented as models and transformation 
functions are used to map between models as well as to 
automatically generate executable code. MDA used the 
following hierarchy of models [13], [14]: 
• Computation Independent Model (CIM) dedicated 
to the representation of domain and system 
requirements in the environment in which the 
system will operate; 
• Platform Independent Model (PIM) dedicated to 
modeling of the systems functionality, but without 
a definition of any platform for implementation; 
• Platform Specific Model (PSM) which is a 
modified PIM through the transformation into a 
platform dependent model. 
MDA is applied to modeling interoperable systems 
and a major result of ATHENA IP is a set of models and 
tools called PIM4SOA (PIM for Service Oriented 
Architecture). MDA is also used for model driven systems 
security engineering solutions by providing a framework in 
which security concepts are modeled using UML and 
Domain Specific Languages at the PIM abstraction level 
and are merged with other requirement models that could 
include interoperability requirements. These secure 
enhanced PIMs are transformed to different open standard 
specifications (PSM) which in turn configure the 
component based reference architecture. However a risk of 
using MDA is that it is not possible to adeuqately capture 
the layers of complexity at the implementation level. 
3.2 Levels 
The European Interoperability Framework (EIF) 
identifies three levels of interoperability [2]: 
 
 
Organizational interoperability (i.e., business unit, 
process and people interactions across organization 
borders) is focused on the definition of business goals, 
modeling business processes and organizational 
collaboration issues. It addresses the requirements of the 
user community by making services and systems available, 
easily identifiable, accessible and user-oriented. In the 
context of IT, definition of this level corresponds with the 
business interoperability definition by Legner and Wende 
(2006) [7]: ‘the organisational and operational ability of an 
enterprise to co-operate with its business partners and to 
efficiently establish, conduct and develop IT-supported 
business relationships with the objective to create value’.  
Semantic interoperability (i.e., information and service 
sharing) is concerned with ensuring that the same meaning 
of exchanged information is obtainable in the same way by 
any other computer system and/or human agent that were 
not initially designed for this purpose.  
Technical interoperability (i.e., data and message 
exchange) covers the technical aspects of connecting 
(computer) systems and services through interfaces, 
protocols etc. applying software engineering techniques. It 
includes key aspects such as open interfaces, 
interconnection services, data integration and middleware, 
as well as data presentation and exchange, accessibility and 
security services as defined by the standard IEC 
TC65/290/DC. 
Figure 1 depicts these main levels of interoperability. In 
addition the security level is suggested and it covers the 
description of the security that can be incorporated into the 
design of an interoperable secure system.  This level 
includes security concepts, services and procedures.   The 
security level can be split into the following components: 
1. Physical software systems security based on 
applying computer cryptography and safety or 
software criticality implementation; 
2. Human / personnel security based on the 
procedure, regulations, methodologies that make 
an organisation/enterprise/ system safe  
3. Cyber / Networking level that is mainly concerned 
with  controling cyber attacks and vulnerabilities 
and reducing their effects. 
 
3.3 Interoperability Requirements 
Requirements elicitation and modeling are detailed 
processes with highly developed methods and procedures 
as part of requirements engineering and management. The 
application of the principles of requirements engineering is 
not an objective of this paper and we provide only a few 
ideas on interoperability and security requirements 
supporting the approach. From a systems engineering 
perspective, the requirements for interoperability should be 
positioned alongside those for maintainability, reliability, 
safety and supportability [15]. These requirements can be 
described at a high- level as follows: 
a) network enabled systems  must be able to 
effectively and efficiently interoperate if needed 
b) (newly) designed systems must be able to 
interoperate effectively and efficiently and time 
sensitively when deployed anywhere within legacy 
dominated Systems of Systems environments; 
c) human driven socio-technical systems must be 
able to interoperate at different levels; 
d) robustness to external and unexpected events must 
be considered. 
 
3.4 Using SABSAR and Model Driven Security 
Figure 2 shows a modeling framework for designing 
interoperable secure systems that combine model driven 
security, requirements modeling and enterprise security 
architecting as will be explained in the sections that follow.  
 
 
Figure 2. Modeling Interoperable Secure Systems 
 
System A Technical 
Semantic 
        Organisational  & Business 
    System B 
Architecture 
B 
Architecture 
A 
Figure 1. Levels of Interoperability including Security  
Security 
Additional investigations and experimental work 
are required at the intersection of existing modeling 
approaches and this could be directed to meta-modeling 
techniques for systems of systems security engineering.  
3.4.1 SABSAR : Enterprise Security Architecture 
Generally the main role of architecting is to effectively 
manage complexity and, therefore, approaches for the 
management of complexity has also included system 
security and certification aspects. SABSA (Sherwood 
Applied Business Security Architecture) is a framework 
and methodology for Enterprise Security Architecture and 
Service Management used by numerous organisations [11].   
This framework is used globally to meet a wide variety of 
Enterprise needs, including Risk Management, 
Information Assurance, Governance, and Continuity 
Management. It ensures that the needs of the enterprise are 
met completely and that security services are designed, 
delivered and supported as an integral part of the business 
and IT / software systems management infrastructure. The 
model follows the Zachman architecting principles [16].  
3.4.2 Model Driven Security 
INCOSE Working group on Systems Security 
Engineering has defined Model Driven Security as “An 
element of system engineering that applies scientific and 
engineering principles to identify security vulnerabilities 
and minimize or contain risks associated with these 
vulnerabilities” [17]. Therefore it is a discipline that uses a 
systems engineering approach and methods to produce a 
comprehensive spectrum of protection mechanisms for a 
system or program at the following levels: physical, 
information, software systems, communications, personnel, 
and operations. According to ISO/IEC 13335 security 
standard “system security consists of defining, achieving, 
and maintaining the following properties: confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, non-repudiation, accountability, 
authenticity, and reliability” [18]. The systems engineering 
approaches include model based systems engineering, and 
Basin et al. (2005) have demonstrated that the Model 
Driven Architecture (MDA) can be specialized to the 
Model Driven Security approach using RBAC (Role Based 
Access Control); this is a mechanism used for modeling 
the access control for designed models [10]. The concept of 
role-based permissions is included in the principles of 
access control, which defines limits of using only the IT 
resources they need to perform their tasks. The types of 
access control are as follows [10]: 
• Discretionary: access to information is controlled 
by the owner. 
• Mandatory: Imposes security conditions and 
restrictions for all users of IT systems. 
• Role based: access to information and its 
resources is based on the user’s role. 
Model Driven Security Architecture is defined as:  
• an extension of MDA through modeling the 
security requirements in PIM (Platform 
Independent Model) 
• applying SecureUML: A UML-Based Modeling 
Language for Model Driven Security. 
 
3.5 Security Requirements 
System security weaknesses originate in the 
incomplete or conflicting nature of security requirements. 
A comprehensive analysis of software systems security is 
described in Software Security Assurance State-of-the-Art 
Report (SOAR) by Goertzel et al. (2007) [19]. Software 
assurance is “the ability to provide to software acquirers 
and users the justifiable confidence that software will 
consistently exhibit its required properties. Among these 
properties, security is what enables the software to exhibit 
those properties even when the software comes under 
attack” (Goerzel et al., 2007: xvii) [19]. The considered 
properties are correctness, predictable operation, usability, 
interoperability, performance, dependability, and safety. 
The security requirements can be classified as follows:   
Functional Security Requirements which are 
security functions and services that need to be achieved by 
the system under consideration. Examples could be 
authentication, authorization, backup, server-clustering, 
etc. This requirement artefact can be derived from best 
practices, policies, and regulations.  
Non-Functional Security Requirements which are 
security related architectural requirements, such as 
robustness, high integrity and scalability. This type of 
requirement is typically derived from architectural 
principles and best practices including standardisation.  
Secure Development Requirements which describe 
required activities during system development which 
assure that the outcome is not subject to vulnerabilities. 
Examples could be data classification, coding guidelines or 
test methodology. 
Mead (2007) has analysed the process for the 
identification of security requirements using a method 
called “security quality requirements engineering” 
(Square) that has been developed within the CERT 
programme at Carnegie Mellon University’s Software 
Engineering Institutes [20]. The main issues regarding the 
identification of security requirements are as follows: 
a. Although they are planned to be identified during the 
systems life cycle they tend to be general mechanisms such 
as password protection, firewalls and virus detection tools. 
b. They are developed independently of the rest of the 
requirements engineering and hence are not integrated into 
the main stream activities. 
c. Therefore, specific system protection mechanisms are 
neglected and implementation is not feasible. 
d. Some times the security requirements are considered 
negative requirements such as “the system shall not allow 
successful attacks” (Mead, 2007:46) [20] 
e. The security requirements are still not seen as a benefit 
for the systems due to increase costs.  
4 Gaps Identification and Analysis  
Generally, integration of system design models 
consisting of interoperable models and security models has 
not been achieved. Currently the need to maintain a critical 
balance between openness and embedded security 
requirements from the modeling stage has not yet received 
much consideration. Although security requirements and 
threats are often considered during the early development 
phases (requirements analysis), and security mechanisms 
are later employed in the final development phases (system 
integration and test), there is a gap in the middle. As a 
result, security is typically integrated into systems in an ad-
hoc manner, which degrades the security and 
maintainability of the resulting systems. Despite the 
development of SecureUML the development of 
interoperable secure systems is not guaranteed, because the 
balance is towards achieving security neglecting 
interoperability. 
The Security Enterprise Architecture Model SABSAR 
[11] does not consider enterprise interoperability 
architectures, levels and layers and this model could not be 
mapped to the levels of interoperability of EIF as well as 
layers of NCOIC QoS [4]. Therefore, a more holistic 
approach to modeling interoperability and security 
requirements from the system design stage is required. It is 
also needed to progress the development of interoperable 
security strategies through standard harmonisation, 
mapping and/or the development of a top-level, new 
standard that can cover different systems characteristics, 
including interoperability and security.  
5 Modeling and Contributions 
The suggested integrated modeling approach is shown 
in figure 2 based on combining interoperability and 
security models and balancing the requirements that have 
been briefly presented in the previous sections; and 
described them through a model driven approach or an 
enterprise architecture. The requirements presented in the 
3rd paragraph of section III could be modified as follows:  
a. secure systems  must be able to effectively and efficiently 
interoperate only with other secure  systems;  
b. (newly) designed secure systems must be able to 
interoperate effectively and efficiently when deployed in a 
secure environment, time sensitively; 
c. human driven socio-technical systems, legal procedures 
and regulation as well as governance principles must be 
described (e.g. governance modeling using ontologies); 
d. external, unexpected events and potential vulnerabilities 
and threats have to be considered and methods to 
dynamically model them have to be developed (e.g. iGRC 
programme); 
e. harmonization and/or mapping of enterprise 
architectures, and secure interoperable architectures at 
different levels of abstraction have to be produced. 
These general high level requirements can be 
particularised for secure enterprise systems that 
interoperate as follows. The following examples are based 
on Haley et al. (2007) [21]: 
“The system shall provide Personnel Information only to a 
system of Human Resources” 
“The system shall provide this information only during 
normal working hours
“IT personnel should follow rules defined by data 
protection acts and nondisclosure agreements” 
“Confidential information shall be provided with special 
approval and only to a member of the organisation” 
 
6 Conclusion  
A combined modeling approach for the linkage 
between systems interoperability and security has been 
discussed. The paper urges consistent and harmonious 
modeling  of interoperability and security requirements  at 
the system design stage, as well as  using model based 
driven architecture. This will embed security and 
interoperability requirements in the design stage of a new 
system to achieve the following results: 
a. Provision of security and interoperable systems solutions 
that are harmoniously integrated into enterprise 
architecture. 
b. Security and interoperable capabilities in which  
requirements are adequately considered in systems 
engineering modeling and design activities.  
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